Preface
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In recent years, despite the general interest in the subject, there has been very little technical philosophical discussion of the metaphysical and, specifically, theistic implications of Big Bang cosmology. Most of the published discussions of these implications are found in popular science books written by physicists, which often lack the philosophical sophistication that philosophers normally seek in their work. On the other hand, the discussions of theism and atheism in contemporary journals and books written by philosophers almost always proceed in a way that takes no cognizance of Big Bang cosmology. This constitutes a surprising gap in the philosophical literature, considering that the question ‘Did God create the Big Bang?’ has obvious relevance to the philosophy of religion and has even become a commonplace question among members of the general public. The present book attempts to fill this gap to some extent by presenting a philosophically educated debate between a defender of the theist viewpoint (Craig) and a defender of the atheist viewpoint (Smith) regarding the implications of classical and quantum Big Bang cosmology. Our aim is to combine a scientifically informed treatment of the cosmological theories with rigorously developed philosophical arguments and counter-arguments with a view toward assessing the bearing of these theories on the question of the existence of God.
The structure of this book consists of alternating essays by Craig and Smith. Typically, an essay by one of us will consist in a criticism of the arguments developed by the other in a preceding essay. The book divides into three separate debates, corresponding to Part I, Part 2, and Part 3.
Part I, ‘The Theistic Cosmological Argument’, concerns Craig’s reformulation, in light of modern cosmology, of a traditional argument for the existence of God based on considerations about the finitude of past time. Craig presents the case that there is a sound argument for theism based on Big Bang cosmology and the impossibility of an infinite past, and Smith counters that Craig’s arguments are unsound. It is important to note that despite our divergent viewpoints we begin from a common ground. We agree that the empirical evidence warrants the belief that the universe began to exist with the Big Bang about i 5 billion years ago, and we both present several arguments for this thesis. Our disagreement in Part i concerns two further theses. First, Craig believes that considerations pertaining to Cantor’s theory of the infinite show that the past is necessarily finite, but Smith denies this and argues that the past is possibly infinite (although probably finite, given the empirical evidence for Big Bang cosmology). The debate about the Cantorian infinite and whether the past is necessarily finite occurs in Essays I, II, and III. The second main area of disagreement concerns whether it is reasonable to believe the Big Bang has a cause (Craig’s position) or whether it is reasonable to believe that the Big Bang occurs uncaused (Smith’s position). This debate about the caused or uncaused nature of the Big Bang may be found in Essays I, IV, V, and VI.
Part 2, ‘The Atheistic Cosmological Argument’, concerns Smith’s argument for the non-existence of God that is based on Big Bang cosmology. Smith argues that Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with God’s existence and Craig argues contrariwise. Smith presents the basics of his atheistic argument in Essay VII, Craig responds to it in Essay VIII, Smith responds to Craig’s criticisms in Essay IX, and Craig ends the discussion in Essay X with a reply to Smith’s Essay IX. The debate in Part 2 centres on issues involving the unpredictability of the Big Bang singularity with which the universe b Smith argues that the Big Bang singularity is physically real, that its future cannot be predicted even by a divine mind (via counterfactuals allegedly known prior to creation), that it would require irrational acts of supernatural intervention if created, and is not something a perfect being (God) would create. Craig argues that the singularity is not physically real, but that even if it were physically real, it could be predicted by God (by God’s prior knowledge of counterfactuals about it) and that the mentioned acts of supernatural intervention are not irrational.
The third main debate in the book occurs in Part 3, ‘Theism, Atheism, and Hawking’s Quantum Cosmology’, which concerns the bearing of quantum cosmology on the philosophy of religion. We discuss the most developed version of quantum cosmology, the version developed by Stephen Hawking in the 1980s. Craig argues that Hawking’s quantum cosmology is not a viable alternative to theism, whereas Smith argues that it is a more plausible theory than theism. Much of this debate concerns the interpretation of Hawking’s quantum cosmology and whether his cosmology even makes physical sense. Craig argues that Hawking’s theory (with its notion of imaginary time, splitting universes, infinite dimensional superspace, etc.) is physically unintelligible and therefore is not a realistic alternative to theism. Smith argues that Hawking’s theory does not carry any of the above-mentioned physical implications (imaginary time etc.) and that Hawking’s cosmology is both inconsistent with theism and rationally preferable to theism. Part 3 supplements the discussions in Parts i and 2, since Parts i and 2, although they take into account some considerations based on quantum cosmology (in certain sections of Essays IV and V), are mostly about classical Big Bang cosmology.
This book contains both technical and non-technical accounts of the scientific theories that are considered. Readers who lack a familiarity with classical Big Bang cosmology are advised to consult Craig’s presentation in Essay I and Smith’s Appendix IV.2 for an introductory and relatively non-technical explanation. Only a few sections on classical Big Bang cosmology, such as the first half of Smith’s Essay VI, are technically dense, and the scientifically untutored reader may safely skip the technical passages without losing the main thread of the debate between Craig and Smith. Craig’s essay on Hawking in Part 3 should be accessible to philosophers not familiar with quantum cosmology, and Smith’s essay on Hawking in Part 3, although more technical, should be accessible to these philosophers once they have read Craig’s essay.
We hope the reader will leave this book with an increased appreciation of the profound issues involved in supporting either a theistic or atheistic interpretation of Big Bang cosmology. It does not conclude the philosophical debate about theism, atheism, and Big Bang cosmology, but begins it.
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