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Review of: Time, Tense, and Causation. By Michael Tooley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. xvi, 399.
By Quentin Smith Western Michigan University
Published in: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108, No.1 (January 1999)
The main goal of Michael Tooley's groundbreaking book is to establish a position intermediate between the tenseless theory of time and the standard tensed theory of time. Tooley argues for a novel version of the tensed theory of time, namely, that the future is unreal and the present and past real, and yet that reality consists only of tenseless facts. The question that naturally arises for the reaper concerns an apparent paradox: how could the tensed theory of time be true (and time be "dynamic") if reality consists only of tenseless facts? The key idea in Tooley's original thesis is the distinction between actuality simpliciter and actuality as of a time, a distinction that (if tenable) implies that both the tenseless theory and the standard tensed theory are false. Tooley says the notions of actuality and actuality as of a time are primitive notions, not capable of further analysis or explanation. This is equivalent to the thesis that it is ultimately a primitive and unanalyzable assertion that there is a true position intermediate between the tenseless and standard tensed theories of time. Tooley is well aware that his thesis will meet resistance from proponents of the tenseless and standard tensed theories of time. Accordingly, he be- gins by saying that he will argue that there is no objection to treating the notions of actuality simpliciter and actuality as of a time as primitive. In defense of the claim that actuality simpliciter is primitive, he says that Robert Adams's theory that "is actual" is analyzable in terms of the notion expressed by "is true" is implausible since it is circular; being true is "a matter of relation to something outside the proposition, and how can that external something be characterized other than as what is actual" (39). One would like to hear more from Tooley on this matter. For example, the familiar arguments of Kant, Frege, Russell, and most twentieth-century philosophers that actuality is neither a characteristic of things nor a first-order property are not addressed by Tooley. He further argues that actuality simpliciter is "unanalyzable" since some- thing's being actual "does not seem to be a matter of a relationship to something else" (39). This argument does not seem to me to be valid, since Tooley's premise, "actuality is not a relation to something else," does not entail "actuality is unanalyzable." It is consistent with Tooley's premise to hold that actuality is analyzable in terms of a relationship of something to itself (for example, self-identity) or analyzable in terms of some monadic property of a thing (such as being something, being physical (materialism) , being a sense datum (sense data phenomenalism), and the like). Accordingly, it is not clear that it has been validly established that there is a primitive notion of actuality simpliciter. The second allegedly primitive notion, actuality as of a time, is dissimilar to the primitives with which philosophers of time are familiar. His primitive, unanalyzable notion does not mean, for example, the tenseless notion of existing simultaneously with a time t, and it does not mean the tensed notion expressed by 'is present' or 'occurs at whatever time is now'. Nor does it mean is simultaneous with or earlier than a time t or is present or past. What, then, could it mean? Tooley says he will argue "in this section [2.2] " (37) that there is nothing objectionable about treating his notion as primitive. However, I could not find any argument in this section (37~2) that had this thesis as its conclusion. He argues that there is nothing objectionable about taking the different notion of actuality simpliciter as a primitive (37-39). He also presents two arguments for another, distinct thesis, namely that the dynamic theory of time needs both the notion of actuality simpliciter and the notion of actuality as of time ( 40) .The first argument for this conclusion is that propositions, numbers, and uninstantiated universals do not exist in time and therefore that tensed theorists need a distinction between actuality simpliciter and actuality as of a time. Tooley asserts that these abstract objects exist timelessly and does not attempt to answer the many arguments offered in the literature by tensed theorists for the temporal existence of abstract objects. Second, he says tensers need the distinction between actuality simpliciter and actuality as of a time since "besides being able to speak of what is actual as of the present moment, one needs also to be able to make sense of propositions about what was actual, about what will be actual, and more generally, about the totality of what is actual at some time or other" (40). This argument includes in its premises one of the notions Tooley argues it is necessary to distinguish; the premises assume the notion of what is actual as of a moment and its distinctness from a broader notion of actuality. In any case, this is not an argument for the thesis that there is nothing objectionable about taking the notion of actuality as of a time as primitive. Tooley then proceeds to offer another argument, but it is also not an argument that "there is nothing objectionable" about the view that the notion of actuality as of a time is primitive. Rather, this next argument is that the notion of being an actual temporal state of affairs cannot be analyzed in terms of the notion of being actual as of a time, since (on the dynamic view) it is not the case that every time is actual as of every other time. But this argument is not the one promised, since if a concept X cannot be analyzed in terms of a concept Y; it does not follow that y is unanalyzable. Tooley concludes: "Consequently, it seems that, on any dynamic view of the world, there are two concepts that need to be taken as primitive" (41). However, even if we assume the earlier arguments in this section are valid, all that follows is that a dynamic view requires a notion of actuality that is distinct from the notion of acuality as of a time. None of the arguments have as their conclusion or "consequence" that the notion of actuality as of a time is primitive (or that there is nothing objectionable about taking this notion as primitive). I suggest that an examination of the role that "actuality as of a time" plays in Tooley's book reveals that what Tooley claims to be a primitive notion of acuality as of a time is really the familiar notion in the tenseless theory of time that is expressed by 'being simultaneous with or earlier than a time', taken in conjunction with a decision to mentally or conceptually abstract from what is later than that time. Tooley's theory implies that for each time t, there is something later than that time (except for a possible last instant of time) .Tooley says "the future is part of the totality of reality, and so is actual simpliciter" (303). When Tooley goes on to say that "the future is not actual as of the present moment" (303) one may respond that, given Tooley's rejection of tensed facts, this sentence (if uttered at March 1, 1998) is equivalent to "what is later than March 1, 1998 is neither simultaneous with nor earlier than March I, 1998." Tooley would respond that this equivalence does not obtain, since it fails to capture the primitive, unanalyzable notion of being actual as of March 1, 1998. Given that Tooley has not in fact argued that there is nothing objectionable about taking actuality as of a time as a primitive notion, why cannot the tenser and detenser respond at this point that there is no such understandable notion? Further, tensers and detensers may even argue that Tooley's appeal to such an alleged notion involves an implicit contradiction, namely, that his corresponding distinction between truth simpliciter and truth at a time allows such implications as the following one. If Tooley's theory is true, then (1) The sentence 'There are at least two hurricanes in 2002 A.D.' is true implies (2) Any 1998 token of' At least two hurricanes will occur four years from now' is not true in 1998. On Tooley's theory, both (1) and (2) are true simpliciter (assuming there are at least two hurricanes in 2002) .But this seems to be an implicit contradiction, since (I) and (2) cannot both be true. Sentence (I) implies that four years later than 1998, at least two hurricanes occur. This in turn implies that if it is now 1998, then four years later at least two hurricanes will occur. This in its turn implies that if the sentence' At least two hurricanes will occur four years from now' is uttered in 1998, so that 'now' refers to 1998, then it is true when it is uttered, in 1998. But this means that (2) is false. Since Tooley theory implies that if (1) is true, (2) is also true, his theory implies a contradiction. If Tooley responds that there are no contradictions since his notions of troth simpliciter and troth at a time are definable in part in terms of his primitive, unanalyzable notions of actuality simpliciter and actuality as of a time, such that these primitive notions serve to guarantee (or are stipulated to guarantee) that there are no contradictions of the sort that I have pointed out, then we are back again to the counterresponse of the standard tensers and detensers that they can understand no such primitive notions. On behalf of Tooley, one might see how he could most effectively respond to such challenges. For example, he could respond to the standard tenser that he finds no understandable concept expressed by the irreducibly tensed notion expressed by 'is present' and he finds that considerations based on McTaggart's paradox call into question the validity of the tenser's reasoning about when sentence-tokens, sentence-types, or propositions possess their truth values (for example, will be true, is now true, and was true). Perhaps Tooley and the standard tenser are left with mutually question-begging arguments against each other (which would mean Tooley has accomplished the considerable feat of introducing a new theory into the traditional debate, equally as viable as the standard tensed theory) . Furthermore, Tooley and the, standard tenser could both agree that the tenseless theory of time fails to take into account the dynamic nature of time, just as eliminativist materialism in the philosophy of mind (arguably) fails to take into account the mental nature of humans. Accordingly, one might say that Tooley has accomplished something rather remarkable, namely, introducing an intermediate position between the standard tensed theory (Broad, Prior, Gale, etc.) and the tenseless theory (MelIor, Oaklander, Le Poidevin, etc.). Nonetheless, I would be interested in seeing how Tooley would respond to the criticisms of the standard tensers (such as myself) and the detensers (such as in Le Poidevin's review in the British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Oaklander's review in Mind, and MelIor's criticism in Real Time II) .(Actually, an interesting session on Tooley's book was given by the APA's Philosophy of Time Society, with Oaklander, McCall, and myself commenting on Tooley's book; the end result seemed to be a multi-intersecting, fourfold case of "being hoisted on one own's petard," although naturally each of us thought it was only others who were so hoist- ed [I].) Apart from questions that standard tensers and detensers may have about Tooley's central phrase 'actual as of a time', some readers may note that a trade-<>ff for Tooley's particular way of systematically treating his main subject matter and related topics is that he does not always have the space to present lengthy or detailed arguments for some of the many interesting theses he advances. However, in many or most cases, rigorous and in-depth argumentation is offered for his various theses. For example, he gives an extensive and well-argued defense of three-valued logic and the thesis that disjunction is not truth-functional. A strong case is made against what many philosophers now call "presentism" (namely, that the present is real hut that the past and future are not real in any sense). Tooley also provides a careful and plausible argument that some space time points stand in causal relations to one another. In addition, using the EPR experiments as his justification, he develops an excellent "modified STR theory" that posits an absolute space and time and a privileged frame of reference. Tooley's theory of absolute simultaneity seems to me to he the most well worked out and carefully argued Physical theory for absolute simultaneity that has been developed since Popper announced very briefly in the early 1980s that Aspect's EPR experiments confirmed that a neo-Lorentzian theory of absolute simultaneity is needed to replace Einstein's theory of relative simultaneity. There has been much hand-waving in this direction since then, but Tooley is the first to achieve a rigorous physical theory of EPR-based absolute simultaneity. Tooley's excellent arguments on this score seem to me to be the best part of the book (chapter eleven) and to be sufficient by themselves to make the book a "must read" by philosophers and physicists of time. Other examples of good arguments abound. But it seems to me that the greatest virtue of the book is the admirable originality, creativity, and philosophical fecundity that Tooley displays. In this book, as in Tooley's previous works, he displays an unusual independence of mind and philosophical courage. He takes on the presuppositions of the entire tradition of the tensed versus tenseless theory of time debate (rejecting both standard positions), and also takes on many other "received views," and the result is the most novel book on the tensed and tenseless theories of time that has been published in recent memory. QUENTIN SMITH Western Michigan University
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