Preface
There are two theories of time: the tenseless theory and the tensed theory. The tenseless theory holds that temporal determinations consist only of the relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with. The tensed theory of time (at least on one version) holds that temporal determinations also include the properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity. The tenseless and tensed theories also entail different theses about language, specifically about the semantic content of tensed sentences. The tensed theory implies, for example, that the indexical “now” in the sentence “The sun is now shining” conveys that the sun’s shining has the property of presentness. But the tenseless theory holds that it does not and that “now” (as uttered on some occasion) merely refers to the date or time of the sun’s shining or merely conveys that the sun’s shining stands in some temporal relation (such as being simultaneous with the utterance of the sentence).
One of the aims of this work is to defend the tensed theory of time. This requires that the tensed theory be defended not only against the criticisms made by tenseless theorists such as D. H. Mellor and L. Nathan Oaklander, but also against the most prevalent theory in contemporary philosophy of language, the New Theory of Reference, which entails that temporal indexicals such as “now” directly refer to times and do not ascribe properties of presentness, pastness, or futurity. The defense of the tensed theory occupies Part I.
My argument for the tensed theory of time is a means to the end of establishing a more comprehensive theory about language and time. I shall call this theory presentism. According to this theory, every possibly true sentence includes presentness in its semantic content. This implies that all possibly true tenseless sentences, including all sentences that seem to have a timeless semantic content (such as “Two plus two equals four”) include components that ascribe a presentness-involving property to something. I will argue that every possibly true sentence is synonymous with a presentist sentence, that is, with a sentence that has “presentness” for its grammatical subject and an expression of a form such as “inheres in such-and-such” for its grammatical predicate. For example, it will be maintained (despite initial appearances) that “Two plus two equals four” is synonymous with “Presentness inheres always in the equality of four to two plus two.” This will require a development of a detailed theory of the nature of the de re or de dicto propositions expressed by sentences and of the states of affairs that correspond to true propositions.
The defense of presentism will also require a critical confrontation with Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. It is perhaps implicitly obvious in the preceding remarks that presentism entails that presentness inheres in events or states absolutely, that is, that time is absolute, not relative. The argument for presentism will thus involve an argument that Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity does not characterize time. It will be shown that Einstein’s theory entails merely that certain observable luminal relations are possessed relatively to a reference frame and that temporal relations and properties are possessed absolutely, even though in the case of distant physical events we may not be able to know their temporal relations or properties. The defense of the presentist theory of language and time will be the concern of part II.
I began work on this treatise in the fall of 1983 and the final draft was completed in the fall of 1990. I am especially indebted to William F. Vallicella for helpful critical comments on several of the successive drafts. William R. Carter also pro vided helpful suggestions about a penultimate draft that led me to delete long introductory and concluding parts and to add the chapter on Einstein’s theory of relativity, as well as make smaller improvements. A major stimulus to the theories developed in this book is the critical comments offered by L. Nathan Oaklander on some of my published and unpublished articles on the tensed theory of time. Hector Neri Castañeda, William Lane Craig, Storrs McCall, D. H. Mellor, Gilbert Plumer and J.J.C. Smart also provided comments in correspondence or discussion that proved useful in writing the final draft.
Yellow Springs, Ohio Q. S.
February 1993