Contents
I. The Argument for the Tensed Theory of Time
1. The Translation Method and the Tensed and Tenseless Theories of Time, 3
1.1. The Translation Method, 3
1.2. The Old Tenseless Theory of Time, 8
1.3. The New Tenseless Theory of Time, 11
1.4. The A Priori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time, 14
1.5. The A Posteriori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time, 18
2. The Untranslatability of A-Sentences by Tenseless Date-Sentences, 27
2.1. The Date Theory of A-Sentences, 27
2.2. The Truth Conditions of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date- Sentences, 33
2.3. The Confirmation Conditions of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date- Sentences, 39
A. Adolf Grünbaum’s Theory of A-Date-Sentence-Tokens, 40
B. William Lycan’s Theory, 42
C. David Kaplan’s and Nathan Salmon’s Implicit Theories, 44
D. Michelle Beer’s Theory, 49
2.4. The Entailment Relations of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date- Sentences, 50
2.5. The Logical Identities of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date- Sentences, 56
2.6. A Similarity Between A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences: Intersubstitutivity in Extensional Contexts, 61
3. The Untranslatability of A-Sentences by Tenseless Token-Reflexive
Sentences, 67
3.1. The Old and New Token-Reflexive Theories of A-Sentences, 67
3.2. The Truth Conditions of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive
Sentences, 72
3.3. The Confirmation Conditions of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-
Reflexive Sentences, 78
3.4. The Entailment Relations of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences, 81
3.5. The Logical identities of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive
Sentences, 86
3.6. The Psychological Theory of A-Sentences, 90
4. The Tensed Theory of A-Sentences, 94
4.1. The Transition to Positive Arguments for the Tensed Theory
of Time, 94
4.2. Outline of the Argument That A-Sentences Express A-Propositions, 94
4.3. The Tensed Explanation of the Tenseless Token-Reflexive Rules of
A-Sentence-Tokens, 98
4.4. The Tensed Explanation of the Tenseless Token-Independent Rules
Governing the Propositions Expressed by A-Sentence-Tokens, 105
4.5. The Tensed Explanation of A-Indexicals and their Relation to
A-Nonindexicals, 110
4.6. The Tensed Theory of Temporal Quasi Indicators, 121
4.7. The Cognitive Significance of A-Indexicals, 124
II. The Argument for Presentism
5. Presentness as a Logical Subject of A-Sentences, 133
5.1. The Theory of Presentism, 133
5.2. A Preliminary Analysis of Property Ascription, 136
5.3. The Conveyance Relation, 141
5.4. Two Species of the Propositional Relation, 144
5.5. Direct and Indirect Property Ascription, 148
5.6. States of Affairs, 151
5.7. Presentness as a Metaphysical Subject of All A-States-of-Affairs, 158
5.8. The “No-Property” Tensed Theory of Time, 166
5.9. McTaggart’s Paradox, 169
6. Presentness as a Logical Subject of Tenseless Sentences, 180
6.1. All Subjects but Presentness Are Local Logicometaphysical
Subjects, 180
6.2. Tenseless Singular and Existential Sentences Other Than B-Sentences, 188
6.3. B-Sentences, 192
6.4. Synthetic Generalizations, 199
6.5. Tautological and Analytic Sentences, 204
6.6. Non-English Sentences, 215
7. Absolute Presentness and the Special Theory of Relativity, 225
7.1. The Special Theory of Relativity, 225
A. All Elsewhere Events Are Present, 226
B. All Events Orthogonal to the Time Axis of a Present Event Are
Present, 227
C. Only What Is Here-Now Is Present, 228
7.2. Metaphysical Time and Special-Theory-Relativity-Time, 229
7.3. The Reductionist Nature of the Special Theory of Relativity Temporal
Definitions, 232
7.4. The Primitiveness and Absoluteness of Metaphysical Time, 234
7.5. All Mental Events Exist in Metaphysical Time, 236
7.6. All Physical Events Are in Metaphysical Time, 239
7.7. Metaphysical Time Is the Only Possible Time, 241
7.8. Metaphysical Time Distinguished from Other Candidates for
“Absolute Time”, 243
A. Cosmic Time, 244
B. Physically Reducible Absolute Time, 245
C. Neo-Lorentz Time, 246
D. Newtonian Time, 247
E. Divine Time, 248
8.1. Summary of the Argument for Presentism, 251
8.2. Ethical Implications of the Argument for Presentism: The Presentist Attitude, 252
Index, 260