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Anthropic Coincidences, Evil and the Disconfirmation of Theism (1992) Quentin Smith The following article was originally published in Religious Studues in 1992 (Volume 28, pp. 347-350). This article is also published at Infidels.org. The
anthropic principle or the associated anthropic coincidences have been used by
philosophers such as John Leslie (1989), William Lane Craig (1988) and Richard
Swinburne (1990) to support the thesis that God exists. In this paper I shall
examine Swinburne's argument from the anthropic coincidences. I will show that
Swinburne's premises, coupled with his principle of credulity and the failure of
his theodicy in The Existence of God, disconfirms theism and confirms instead
the hypothesis that there exists a malevolent creator of the universe. 1. THE ANTHROPIC COINCIDENCES Swinburne
argues that the initial conditions of the universe and the physical constants
mentioned in the basic physical laws are fine-tuned for intelligent life. The
result is anthropic coincidences. The
initial conditions of the universe are the arrangements and properties of the
stuff (matter, energy, space) of the universe at its beginning. The big bang
singularity, occurring about 15 billion years ago, is the first state of the
universe and initial conditions pertain to this singularity or, better, to the
explosion of this singularity in the 'big bang' that commenced the evolution of
the universe. The
physical constants are the strengths of the forces and the masses of the
particles that are mentioned in the basic physical laws. There are four forces
(gravity, electromagnetic, strong and weak) and two types of particles (bosons
and fermions). Swinburne
does not offer a precise definition of fine-tuning, but the following definition
is both serviceable and consistent with the spirit of his article. A certain set
of values of initial conditions and physical constants of a universe are
fine-tuned for intelligent life if and only if (a) each of the values of the
initial conditions and physical constants in this set is a physically necessary
condition for the evolution of intelligent life (1990: 164), (b) the values in
this set are jointly sufficient for ('give rise to' (1990: 157)) the evolution
of intelligent life, and (c) there is only an extremely small range of all
physically possible values of the initial conditions and physical constants that
meet conditions (a) and (b). If any value meets these three conditions, it is an
anthropic coincidence. An
example offered by Swinburne of an initial condition that is an anthropic
coincidence is the rate of expansion of the universe from the big bang
singularity. If this rate were slightly faster, galaxies, stars and planets
would not form; if slightly slower, the universe would collapse before any atoms
formed. Swinburne considers the objection that the Inflation theories developed
during the 1980s show that the expansion rate is not an anthropic coincidence
(since condition (c) is not met) and offers a retort that will undoubtedly raise
the eyebrows of physicists, that it seems difficult to formulate any Inflation
theory that is not 'ill justified by data' (1990: 162-3). Given the virtually
universal acceptance of Inflation by contemporary physicists, it would seem that
a more rational response to this objection is to adopt Leslie's line (1989: 31)
and point out that Inflation theories presuppose anthropic coincidences of their
own, e.g. the fact that the two components of the cosmological constant (bare
lambda and quantum lambda) must cancel each other with an accuracy better than
one part in 1050 in order for galaxies and planets to form. An
example of a value of a physical constant that is an anthropic coincidence is
the electron to proton mass ratio, mm/mn ~ (1836)-1. This small value is a
necessary condition of there being DNA molecules. This
explanation of the basic concepts in Swinburne's 'argument from the fine-tuning
of the universe' enables its formulation to be presented and evaluated. 2.
SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENT THAT THEISM IS CONFIRMED BY THE ANTHROPIC COINCIDENCES The
anthropic coincidences confirm theism, Swinburne claims, since if theism is true
these coincidences are much more likely to occur than they otherwise would be.
This can be stated precisely. Where P = probability, e = evidence, h =
hypothesis and k = background knowledge, e confirms h if and only if P(e/hk)
> P(e/k). 'e confirms h' means P(h/ek) > P(h/k). 'e significantly confirms
h' means P(h/ek) >> P(h/k). The argument from the anthropic coincidences
to God requires that: e = there are many anthropic coincidences; h = God exists;
k = there is a universe that begins from an initial singularity and is governed
by laws that have the form of our four-force laws. Given
this, P(h/ek) >> P(h/k) since P(e/hk) >> P(e/k). In words, this
means that the probability that God exists given the anthropic coincidences and
a universe with
an initial singularity and four-force laws is much greater than the probability
that God exists given only a universe with an initial singularity and four-force
laws, since the probability of the anthropic coincidences given the existence of
God and a universe with an initial singularity and four-force laws is much
greater than the probability of the anthropic coincidences given only a universe
with an initial singularity and four-force laws. The
first thing I want to say by way of evaluating Swinburne's argument is that e
confirms h': h' = there is a malevolent creator of the universe, no less than it
confirms h. By a 'malevolent spirit' I understand a spirit that either has all
evil intentions or has some evil intentions and some good ones. (Hitler and
Stalin were malevolent persons, but they both had some good intentions.) A
malevolent spirit would desire a universe with intelligent life no less than
would a benevolent spirit, since the realization of moral evil requires the
existence of intelligent life no less than does the realization of moral good. A
spirit cannot exercise her malevolence on inanimate matter but has abundant
opportunity to be cruel if there are intelligent creatures capable of suffering,
harm and premature death. Accordingly, we may say about h' what Swinburne says
about h, namely that P(h'/ek) >> P(h'/k) since P(e/h' k) >> P(e/k) It
is not a paradox that the same evidence e confirms equally well two incompatible
hypotheses; this is a familiar principle of confirmation theory, known since
Carnap's The Logical Foundations of Probability, section 86 (also see (Salmon,
1975: 6-8)). If it appears paradoxical, it is because one is confusing relative
confirmation (which I am here using 'confirmation' to express) with absolute
confirmation (which I shall use 'makes highly probable' to express). The same
evidence cannot make highly probable each of two incompatible hypotheses, but it
can increase the probability of each of two incompatible hypotheses (i.e. make
the two hypotheses more probable than they would have been without the
evidence). A
decision between two hypotheses each of which is equally confirmed by the same
evidence e can be made if there is some further evidence e' that disconfirms one
of the hypotheses but confirms the other. In the case at hand, e' = there is a
large amount of gratuitous natural evil. Is
e' true ? It certainly seems to be. Consider one example from thousands.
Psychoses come in two main types, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder ('manic
depression'). Both are genetically inherited diseases. Bipolar disorder is
caused by a dominant gene on the X chromosome. Typically, the person with this
gene does not have this disease from birth but develops it later in life,
usually during adulthood. Suppose there is a person Alice with this gene who is
living a happy and morally good life up until age 33, when there is a relatively
rapid onset of the disease. Alice acquires a chronic. endogenous, rapid cycling
bipolar disorder and is mentally ill for the remainder of her life. This is a
natural evil. Is it gratuitous? Swinburne
claims that despite appearances natural evils are justified since they are
logically necessary means to outweighing goods. In the case of incurable
diseases, the outweighing good is the empirical possibility they offer us of
eliminating any future occurrences of these diseases. 'Men can only have the
opportunity to prevent incurable diseases or to allow them to occur, if there
are naturally occurring incurable diseases' (1979: 207-8). However, pace
Swinburne, it is a self-evidently false moral principle that the evil of an
incurable disease is outweighed by the good of the opportunity to prevent future
occurrences of the disease. The falsity of this principle needs little
reflection to become manifest. Consider that if this principle were true, we
would rejoice in each new disease because it would give us an opportunity to
prevent future instances of that disease. We would be currently celebrating the
AIDS epidemic, because the thousands or millions who have died and will die
agonizing deaths from this disease will give us the 'outweighing good' of the
opportunity to prevent future instances of AIDS. But this of course is morally
absurd. The evil of the actual instances of AIDS far outweighs whatever goodness
belongs to the opportunity to prevent possible instances of it. Given
that this is the case, Swinburne has failed to demonstrate that seemingly
gratuitous natural evils are not really gratuitous. Given in addition
Swinburne's principle of credulity ('things are as they seem to be, unless and
until proved otherwise' (1979: 168)) we may conclude that in the light of the
considerations Swinburne has offered, it is reasonable to conclude that there
are gratuitous natural evils. On the same basis, it is reasonable to conclude
that God does not exist, since God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good
and thereby would not permit any gratuitous natural evil. But since gratuitous
natural evils are precisely what we would expect if a malevolent spirit created
the universe, it follows that h' is confirmed. More exactly, P(h'/ee'k) >>
P(h/ee'k) since P(h'/ek) = P(h/ek) and P(h'/e'k) >> P(h/e'k). If any
spirit created the universe, it is malevolent, not benevolent. REFERENCES Craig,
William Lane [1989]. 'Barrow and Tipler on the anthropic principle vs. divine
design'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, 389-95. Leslie,
John [1989]. Universes. New York: Routledge. Salmon,
Wesley [1975]. 'Confirmation and relevance'. In G. Maxwell and R. Anderson,
eds., Induction, Probability, and Confirmation. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press. Smith,
Quentin [1991]. 'Atheism, theism and big bang cosmology'. Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 69, 48-66. Swinburne,
Richard [1979]. The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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